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Game Theory and its Applications in Economics: A Mathematical Perspective

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Abstract:

Game theory, a branch of mathematics, offers valuable insights into the strategic behavior of rational decision-makers in competitive and cooperative scenarios. The paper analyzes different game-theoretic models starting from Nash equilibrium while examining cooperative and non-cooperative games and evolutionary game theory to explain market behavior patterns and bargaining methods and auction processes. This paper examines the mathematical basis of these models and presents detailed explanations regarding their use in actual economic conditions.

Keywords— Game Theory, Economics, Nash Equilibrium, Cooperative Games, Non-Cooperative Games, Evolutionary Game Theory, Auctions, Market Dynamics, Strategic Decision-Making.

I. INTRODUCTION

The principal concept of game theory analyzes how rational agents like people and firms and governments conduct decisions that involve shaping their personal outcomes and the results of other participants. The execution plans of all system elements must be considered in the approach of each participant [14].

The classical approach to game theory exists in non-cooperative game theory since it allows individual players to choose separate actions independently of binding agreements. Non-cooperative game theory establishes Nash equilibrium as its fundamental conceptual framework and adopts its name from John Nash. The equilibrium allows players to get their most advantageous outcome because independent changes to strategies bring no added value so it remains essential to forecast market participant decisions. Economic analysis under the

Nash equilibrium shows high performance through examination of oligopoly pricing methods together with basic investment evaluation and bilateral negotiation sequences.

The analysis of market relationships between bound-together firms who maintain deals such as joint ventures and mergers forms the basis of this branch. Cooperative game theory provides an approach for equitable profit divisions in partnership arrangements because members need fair distribution of collective results. The Shapley value stands as a critical resource in cooperative game theory to determine reward distribution by assessing accurately how coalitions generate value from their participants [10].

Dynamic game theory helps economists study strategic behavior through time-periodic games because it analyzes strategic behavior between repeated competitions and negotiations and long-term investment strategies. Through this method researcher received crucial knowledge about the development process behind competitive and collaborative social behaviors in diverse market contexts.

The main disadvantage stems from the built-in rationale requirement which mandates that all players select actions to maximize their personal utility. Real-world agents demonstrate irrational conduct because they experience cognitive biases as well as information deficiencies coupled with various other influences. Reality-based economic systems become too complex for game-theoretic models since these models need simplified assumptions to understand the natural behaviors of economic actors [12].

The upcoming sections analyze the different game types starting with non-cooperative along with cooperative approaches with their corresponding economic applications. This paper examines economic decision-making, market competition and strategic interactions using Nash equilibrium as its main focus to better explain these concepts.

Novelty and Contribution

The main novelty of this paper involves a detailed study of game theory from an economic perspective focusing on its mathematical core elements and practical usages. The paper unites classical and present-day perspectives from economic literature to present contemporary insights about the field. The paper delivers three main philosophical contributions to the study [9].

The first aspect introduces detailed mathematical information about game theory which includes comprehensive explanations of Nash equilibrium and evolutionary game theory together with cooperative game theory. This paper uses economic perspectives to develop a connected framework which connects theoretical framework to real-world economic applications. The paper functions as a significant tool for economists together with mathematicians who need to explore mathematical frameworks that explain strategic choice behavior.

This paper makes an additional contribution to existing studies examining the boundaries of traditional game theory. The research discusses classical game theory constraints and assumptions to establish possible paths for additional research tackling more authentic elements integration into game-theoretic methodology.

The field demands novel answers to its distinctive interaction problems so game theory functions well because it offers a multilingual analytical approach for handling sophisticated system dynamics. The paper enhances the application of game theory in new economic models while building interfiled research and collaborations between disciplines.

The main contribution of this paper consists of unifying fundamental mathematical game theory concepts and real economic implementation methods and analyzing current field restrictions and forthcoming trends. The paper creates a useful foundation to stimulate research about strategic economic decision-making at both theoretical and practical levels [11].

II. RELATED WORKS

In 2021 R. Olszewski et.al., P. Pałka et.al., A. Wendland et.al., and K. Majdzińska et.al., [15] suggested the application of game theory throughout economic analysis has existed for multiple decades as researchers conducted several studies about its usefulness in various economic scenarios. Game theory received its initial establishment in competitive and cooperative structures so economists expanded its applications to various economic domains including market competition and price strategies and auction mechanics and bargaining procedures.

Market competition has adopted game theory to understand firm behavior in oligopolistic industries dominated by small groups of companies. Each market decision made by a single firm produces effects on its competitors that lead to reaction patterns from those firms. The examination of competitor models serves businesses to locate equilibrium positions despite market pressures but these analysis outcomes generate social costs comparable to the prisoner's dilemma outcome.

In 2023 J.-B. Grodwohl et.al. and G. A. Parker et.al., [8] introduced the advancement of operational resource distribution methods through auctions relies heavily on game theory knowledge in auction theory. Scientists have extensively researched auction models especially the ones used by governments to sell licenses because they examined how sealed-bid and English auction formats impact auction results and bidder strategy decisions.

Game-theoretic models enable analysts to examine genuine settlement exchanges between different parties that include labor unions against management entities and countries during trade negotiations as well as legal agreement participants.

This method tracks population strategy changes when interactions between participants continue without interruption. Knowledge about economic sustainability of practices including business alliances and fair trade agreements emerges from comprehending strategy transformations that occur in times of success and failure.

Game theory maintains rising popularity because researchers use it to analyze digital markets as well as cryptocurrency transactions alongside new technology surveillance efforts. The regulatory apse domains face specific challenges because of their innovative interaction patterns.

In 2021 M. Abedian et.al., A. Amindoust et.al., R. Madahi et.al., and J. Jouzdani et.al., [13] introduced the economy's extensive game theory usage failed to remove primary difficulties due to the need for absolute rational behavior together with complete knowledge exchange between players. Every player needs to perfectly understand the game structure before they apply rules that solely benefit themselves according to theoretical game theory models. Real people's actual behaviors differ from such assumptions because they possess incomplete knowledge and their thinking capability has clear restrictions that allow psychological factors to affect their choices. Professional researchers create modern behavioral economic and incomplete information models to better predict how people behave.

The tactical evaluation capabilities of game theory maintain their strength because it allows researchers to analyze multiple strategic scenarios in economic investigations. The framework delivers practical applications through competition analysis as well as theory of auctions and Price bargaining and it continues to adapt for new technological domains. Modern real-world conditions require enhanced and authentic simulation models for human choice behaviors because of increasing system complexity.

III. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY

The assessment methodology for game theory applications in economics utilizes theoretical models alongside empirical data analysis and simulation models. A framework must first be created to illustrate strategic actions across economic situations by using non-cooperative games as well as cooperative games and dynamic games [7]. The models will use different mathematical methods such as optimization techniques alongside Nash equilibrium methods together with differential equation modeling of dynamic systems.

In non-cooperative game theory, the core concept requires identifying strategic games with Nash equilibrium points. where u_i represents the utility of player i and s_i represents the strategy chosen by player i :

$$u_i(s_i, s_{-i}) = f(s_i, s_{-i})$$

Here, s_{-i} is the strategy vector of all players except player i, and the objective is to find a strategy profile $(s_1^*, s_2^*, \dots, s_n^*)$ such that no player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally. The solution to this game can be represented as:

$$u_i(s_i^*, s_{-i}^*) \geq u_i(s_i, s_{-i}^*) \; \forall s_i \in S_i$$

In this equation, S_i is the set of all possible strategies for player i, This equilibrium definition confirms that the strategy pick represents an equilibrium because one player lacks the ability to achieve better results by operating independently on a different strategy [1].

We examine coalitions formed by groups of players in cases dealing with cooperative games. The total payoff that develops from coalition C receives the designation v(C) while the Shapley value determines player allocations of such payoffs. The Shapley value $\phi_i(v)$ for player i in a cooperative game is given by:

$$\phi_i(v) = \sum_{C \subseteq N \setminus \{i\}} \frac{|C|!\,(|N| - |C| - 1)!}{|N|!} [v(C \cup \{i\}) - v(C)]$$

Where N is the set of all players, and C represents any subset of players that do not include player i. The formula determines the mean individual contribution of player i to every feasible coalition.

The system of differential equations that describes strategy evolution in dynamic games takes the form:

$$\frac{d}{dt} x_i(t) = f_i(x_1(t), x_2(t), \ldots, x_n(t))$$

Where $x_i(t)$ represents the strategy of player i at time t, and the function f_i describes the rate of change of x_i based on the current strategies of all players. In many cases, this system will be non-linear and may require numerical methods for solving [3].

Evolutionary dynamics between different strategies depend on their success or failure mechanism through the replicator equation. The strategy i follows this replicator equation:

$$\frac{dx_i}{dt} = x_i \left(f_i(x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n) - \bar{f}(x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n) \right)$$

Where $\bar{f}(x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n)$ represents the average payoff in the population. This equation models how the frequency of strategy i changes over time based on its relative success.

In the case of repeated games, the strategy set $s_i(t)$ is updated at each period t, and the expected payoff for player i over multiple periods is given by:

$$V_i = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \delta^{t-1} u_i(s_i(t), s_{-i}(t))$$

Where δ is the discount factor, representing the present value of future payoffs, and T is the number of periods.

Real-world data from oligopoly pricing strategies along with data from auction markets and bargaining scenarios will be used for validating the developed models [2]. A regression model analysis will provide practical estimates of the game-theoretic model parameters during this empirical study. A problem existence emerges to determine the optimal values of parameters for estimation purposes:

$$\min_{\theta} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left(y_i - f(x_i, \theta) \right)^2$$

Where y_i is the observed outcome, x_i is the input data, and θ represents the parameters of the model.

Through Monte Carlo simulation techniques, a big number of strategic scenarios will be produced for assessing result robustness across various operational conditions [6]. A Monte

Carlo simulation creates numerous random strategy and payoff samples to determine approximate game outcomes. The expected value $E[V]$ is given by:

$$E[V] = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} V_i$$

Where N is the number of simulations, and V_i is the outcome of the i-th simulation.

The final recommendation involves using flowcharts to illustrate the game-theoretic model outcomes which demonstrate player interactions and their equilibrium end points. Each decision-making phase of players together with their equilibrium-state-producing feedback loops will be illustrated in the flowchart.



FIGURE 1: STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN GAME-THEORETIC ECONOMIC MODELS

IV. RESULT & DISCUSSIONS

Simulation analyses built from developed models make predictions about different strategic approaches that control these interactions. The research first examines non-cooperative game theory to determine oligopolistic market competition results before showing model effectiveness through analysis. The duopoly market reaches its equilibrium prices after meeting the Nash equilibrium requirements as displayed in Figure 2 through Origin software. The simulation platform reviews price reactions between competing companies through their optimal pricing selections under the assumption of rational operations.



FIGURE 2: NASH EQUILIBRIUM PRICES IN A DUOPOLY MARKET

Results from the model change when experts modify it to include realistic scenarios containing imperfect information. The introduction of variable production cost uncertainties into the market system has transformed equilibrium strategies according to this Excel-generated Figure 3. Oligopolies that operate in real markets experience unpredictable price movements since firms lack complete information about their competitors' costs and production expenses. This leads the market to deviate from the Nash equilibrium solution. Research reveals that firms may choose unpredictable combinations of strategies when they operate under conditions of unclear market information.



FIGURE 3: EFFECT OF UNCERTAINTY IN COSTS ON EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY

The Shapley value from cooperative game theory serves as the basis for distributing total coalition-generated payments among firms. The payoffs analysis unveils substantial difference between the individual player contributions to coalition value generation. The payoff distribution revealed in Table 1 bases strongly on the individual firms' marginal contributions to coalitions while their market strategic positions play a pivotal role in determining these contributions. Various simulations display coalition formation between firms to reach maximum collective profit in the table presented data. Each firm in the Shapley value allocation receives its essential share of coalition total profits.

TABLE 1: PAYOFF ALLOCATION IN COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY

Firm	Contribution to Coalition	Payoff Allocation	Marginal Contribution
Firm A	0.35	100	0.10
Firm B	0.25	75	0.05
Firm C	0.40	120	0.15

The dynamic scenarios that involve repeated firm or player interactions heavily depend on the discount factor to decide what behaviors players will demonstrate throughout multiple periods. Rising discount factors enhance the importance of future rewards so people continue cooperative behavior. Within simulation runs the replicator dynamics equation shows which actions result in strategy changes in multiple round game settings [4].

Simulation analysis shows that distinct bidding patterns lead to different finished auctions when using sealing bids and English auctions respectively. Participants who want to succeed in a sealed-bid auction should submit offers slightly beneath their actual value based on Table

2 findings. Participating players use the closed-bid system to conceal their bidding actions during strategic engagements in auctions. English auction formats establish an interactive bidding scheme because players use small upward movements in their offers to stay above their actual value in the market.

TABLE 2: BIDDING BEHAVIOR IN DIFFERENT AUCTION FORMATS

Auction Type	Player 1 Bid	Player 2 Bid	Winner
Sealed-Bid	85	87	Player 2
English	90	92	Player 2
Sealed-Bid	100	98	Player 1

People in practical scenarios fail to exhibit fully rational conduct throughout their real-world actions. Research results show that decision-makers make choices that diverge from Nash equilibrium theory because their betting preferences are influenced by fear of risk and overbearing confidence.

Due to dedicated cooperation the evaluation showed that collective benefits increase when compared to non-cooperative games systems. Several performance-driven competitive markets prove that organizations succeed best when building partnerships rather than solely trading independently since team-based benefits produce longer-term advantages than pure market rivalry does [5].

V. CONCLUSION

The mathematical game theoretic models provide adequate explanations for numerous economic situations ranging between market competition and resource allocation and bargaining and auctions. Though it bears two main limitations such as the rational behavior assumption and the complexity of solving game cases game theory continues to provide essential analysis of economic systems with regard to competitive and cooperative behavior.

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